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Abstract
While the distinction between spiritualism and science was understood affirmatively as a demarcation
of true science against pseudo-science, nowadays, after several Science Wars, it is obvious for us that
this distinction does not correspond to the actual practices of science but reflects a work of
‘purification’ typical for modernity in the Latourian sense. In the physico-philosophical surroundings
of this boundary epistemological foundations are shaped and modern science is constituted as the
primary way to knowledge. Referring to studies on the history of the occult in the early modern
period, the article shows that in order to understand the stakes of spiritualism and its technical or
personal media we should trace back this boundary to a rarely recognized conceptual transformation
of the ‘occult’. It shifts between insensible and inexplicable. Following this leading difference, the
article traces its function in the emergence of early occultism, the debate between Leibniz and
Newton, and the rise of modern spiritualism and its instrumental repertoire.
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Why should we, in the context of the nineteenth century spiritualism explored by 
this issue, reconsider the formation of the boundary between occult and exact 
knowledge so deeply embedded in the seventeenth century? While this distinction 
was previously understood as distinguishing true science from pseudo-science, 
nowadays, after several periods of dispute which are called Science Wars, it is 
obvious that this line of demarcation does not correspond to the actual practices of 
science but reflects a work of ‘purification’ typical of modernity as understood by 
Latour.1 In the physico-philosophical space surrounding this boundary, 
epistemological foundations are moulded and modern science is constituted as the 
primary method for acquiring knowledge. These epistemologies persist in both 
19th century science and spiritualism.2 Referring to studies on the history of the 
occult in the early modern period by Keith Hutchison, John Henry, Catherine 
Wilson and Richard Paul Blum, I wish to show here that in order to understand 
the stakes of spiritualism – used here to denote very different movements and 
ideas – and its technical or personal media we should trace this boundary back to 
a conceptual transformation of the ‘occult’ that often goes unrecognized. The 
‘occult’ undergoes a shift from the insensible to the inexplicable.3   
For this reason, I would like to begin with a challenge: We should allow 
ourselves to be unsettled and alienated by the occult and consequently put our 
self-understanding and our understanding of the history of science to the test. 
How is it possible, I ask here, to develop a non-hegemonic approach to the history 
of the boundary between science and the occult—without understanding the 
occult as derivative, resistant to enlightenment, an illegitimate truth claim and a 
threat to the way in which we conceive of ourselves? The description of the 
historical transformations of the occult shifting between insensible and 
inexplicable will not lead to a stabilization of our history or lend this history more 
coherence. Instead, this attempt at a conceptual history or a history of a problem 
[Begriffs- oder Problemgeschichte] can help us to destabilize the borderline 
between science and non-science in order to make clear the manner in which the 
categories are mutually dependent. The threat of the occult does not lie in its 
inexplicability or its insensibility, nor in the legitimacy granted to it by believers. 
                                                 
1
 See Latour, Bruno. We have never been modern (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1993). 
2
 A similar perspective on the 19th century can be found in Egil Asprem’s “Pondering 
Imponderables: Occultism in the mirror of late classical physics,” Aries 11, no. 2 (2011). 
3
 In the words of Richard Noakes: “These boundaries are the explanandum, not the 
explanans.“ (Richard Noakes, “Natural Causes? Spiritualism, Science, and the 
Supernatural in Mid-Victorian Britain,” in The Victorian Supernatural, eds. Nicola 
Bown, Carolyn Burdett and Pamela Thurschwell (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 24.) 
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The subversive power of the occult lies in the fact that it pulls the rug out from 
under the position from which we are accustomed to telling its history. 
This double connotation of ‘occult’ in the seventeenth century has, as far 
as I can see, not yet been compared in any systemic way with the developments of 
the nineteenth century. The seventeenth century occult abounds with phenomena 
based on actions at a distance which contradict common modes of causality. The 
following remarks revolve neither around the terminological continuities nor 
discontinuities of concepts, but rather the role of the occult in the constitution of 
modern science, which is based on endless and dizzying discussions of modes of 
explanation and causality, of actions at a distance and their media, both 
instrumental and physical. The concepts of media in spiritualism and in physics 
both emerge from the common demarcation against the inexplicable occult by 
investigating the insensible occult. Here I will present a few basic ideas regarding 
the history of this constitutive distinction, the importance of action at a distance, 
and the latter’s afterlife in the nineteenth century. 
Obviously, occult knowledge was discussed in medieval times, for 
example in Agrippa of Nettesheim’s De Occulta Philosophia and in the writings 
of Paracelsus. All this most certainly belongs to the prehistory of occultism, as it 
has been called since Eliphas Lévi introduced the term in the mid-1800s.4 The 
early modern period was awash in reference to ghosts, the belief in miracles and 
alchemy. In condensed form, the assumption of preoccult occultism was that the 
essence of things is hidden to and invisible from the outside. Classic or ‘whiggish’ 
historiography tells us that this knowledge was banned by modern science 
because it did not conform to the new requirements for exactness. But to  continue 
to write the history of this non-hegemonic knowledge as the Other of anti-occult 
sciences is merely a way of taking the easy road, which both classic 
historiography and self-descriptions of occultism have tended to do.5 The term 
‘occult’ remains ambiguous even taking into account the symmetry of successful 
and failing theories that David Bloor proposed already in 1976.6 With an 
asymmetric perspective we lose sight of the constitutive role of the demarcation 
                                                 
4
 Cf. Eliphas Lévi, La Science des esprits: Révélation du dogme secret des Kabbalistes. 
Esprit occulte des Évangiles. Appréciation des doctrines et des phénomènes spirites 
(Paris: Baillière, 1865). For an overview of the occult sciences see Wouter J. Hanegraaff, 
Esotericism and the academy: Rejected knowledge in western culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 177. 
5
 See, for instance, Sabine Doering-Manteuffel’s Das Okkulte: Eine Erfolgsgeschichte im 
Schatten der Aufklärung; von Gutenberg bis zum World Wide Web (Munich: Siedler, 
2008). 
6
 For an explanation of the principle of symmetry, see David Bloor’s Knowledge and the 
Social Imaginary (London: Routledge, 1976). 
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for both spiritualism and science. By keeping in mind the double meaning of 
occult, it becomes obvious that this constitution is repeated in the heart of 
spiritualism, as spiritualists understand themselves as part of a project of 
enlightenment with regard to the insensible occult. They share with scientists not 
only sets of practices, but also a similar understanding of their role. This, again, is 
bound up with a new conception of instruments and experiments as observing, 
inscribing and registering tools that help to explore what is hidden to the senses. 
The boundary between science and non-science thus appears not to delimit 
threatening knowledge that does not obey the rules, but to provide a structure for 
asymmetry. 
Here I would like to begin by describing the role modern science’s relation 
to the occult plays in the establishment of the so-called scientific revolution and 
the subsequent processes of mechanization. The commonly held opinion that 
modern science ostracized the occult in the course of its secularization and 
continuing emphasis on the scientific method ignores the epistemological core of 
this very process. The reason for this is not only that science, too, can be occult, 
but, in a nutshell, that the understanding of the occult and its redefinitions shape 
what science means. This complex process, far from having run its course, 
persists even in the present day. 
The banishment of the occult happens gradually with the detachment from 
Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy, but it is also presupposed by the later concept 
of a scientific revolution itself. This historiographic entanglement should be kept 
in mind when dealing with this topic: The occult is a highly political term and 
affects the manner in which science conceptualizes its own activities. To explore 
the history of modern science means to investigate the ways in which science has 
come to be understood as such. Assuming this perspective, we are confronted by 
enormous conceptual twists—in the end indicative of the ambiguity of the 
boundary. The well-known transition of occult knowledge to the modern sciences 
– especially prominent in Newton’s interest in alchemy – is a dynamic reforming 
of a field of knowledge with porous boundaries.7 
The reductive equation of the occult with the supernatural is also 
problematic as a historical model of reference. Furthermore, and beyond the scope 
                                                 
7
 Cf. Simon Schaffer, “Godly Men and Mechanical Philosophers: Souls and Spirits in 
Restoration Natural Philosophy,” Science in Context 1, no. 1 (1987). As Ute Frietsch has 
shown, those in the early modern period already distinguish between scienta and pseudo-
scientia: Ute Frietsch, “Häresie und ‘pseudo-scientia‘: Zur Problematisierung von 
Alchemie, Chymiatrie und Physik in der frühen Neuzeit,” in 
Pseudowissenschaft: Konzeptionen von Nichtwissenschaftlichkeit in der 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte, ed. Dirk Rupnow et al. (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2008). 
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of this article, it obscures another critical aspect of modern science: the 
importance of practices and instruments that render visible the invisible, such as 
the telescope, the microscope, detailed theories of smallest bodies and their 
representations. Their effect is more than a ‘visualization of the invisible’8 in the 
sense of an experimental exploration of worlds beyond the sensual. More than 
that, they show the radical tranformation of a world-view that bound human 
senses to the will of God and thus opened up new frontiers of knowledge and 
experimentation. This is the frontier of the occult. For contemporaries, to 
transgress this meant to investigate the occult instrumentally, and this tied the 
imaginary to the symbolic.9 This process fulfills urgent needs of early modern 
science. The practices revolving around the discovery of the invisible can only be 
understood by taking into account the transformations of the occult without 
subordinating them to secularization. 
 
Occult and occult, insensible and inexplicable 
Occult, from the Latin occultus for hidden or secret, has two different meanings 
in the late Middle Ages: insensible and inexplicable. This primary distinction is 
nearly lost when occult is taken to mean supernatural or extrasensual. While one 
should note that these meanings have diverged over time, it is their interplay that 
renders them intelligible. ‘Occult’ as a term continues to be shaped by its 
irreconcilable yet entangled meanings.10 
The existence of insensible forces and causes that are imperceptible or, in 
the words of the time, not manifest, seems trivial to us. We are familiar with 
radiography, light switches and wireless networks, but for people in the Middle 
Ages the insensible is highly problematic. Up until the arrival of early modern 
science at the beginning of the seventeenth century, only sensible phenomena are 
acknowledged as existing. In this context, occult causes, in the sense of insensible 
causes, are usually deemed impossible, and when they are nevertheless accepted, 
their supposed inexplicability is tied to their transcendence of the senses. Each of 
the two meanings thus implies the other. 
                                                 
8
 Cf. Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the order of nature: 1150-1750 
(New York: Zone Books, 1998) and Martina Heßler, “Der Imperativ der 
Sichtbarmachung: Zur Bildgeschichte des Unsichtbaren,” Bildwelten des Wissens. 
Kunsthistorisches Jahrbuch für Bildkritik 4, no. 2 (2006). 
9
 Cf. Erich Hörl, Die heiligen Kanäle (Berlin: Diaphanes, 2005), 107. 
10
 The problems of ignoring this distinction are obvious, for example, in G. MacDonald-
Ross, “Occultism and Philosophy,” in Philosophy, its History and Historiography, ed. A. 
J. Holland (Dordecht: Reidel, 1985). 
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For Neo-aristotelian philosophy, the dominant world-view since the 
rediscovery of Aristotle in the 12th century, such qualitates occultae are narrowly 
defined. As Richard Paul Blum has shown, they include those phenomena that 
cannot be explained by the primary qualities of colour, size, taste, form or 
consistency: the effects of medicine and chemistry, the influences of the sun and 
moon, and of course magnetism and electricity.11 All of these phenomena are 
dismissed because they need to be explained by an insensible cause which acts 
secretly. The common explanations for the attraction of bodies, loadstone or the 
magnet make reference to inner sympathies—for example identical substances 
that act at a distance. This in turn undermines the Aristotelian line of argument 
based on the investigation of the four causes: namely causa efficiens, causa 
finalis, causa formalis and causa materialis. Additionally, occult qualities cast 
doubt on the premise that the senses are the only source of knowledge. 
Consequently, what is insensible must be inexplicable. Simply expressed, the 
assumption of scholars around Thomas Aquinas is that God cannot want us to 
sense something insensible. And something that God does not want cannot exist. 
Only natural things, as opposed to the supernatural, can exist, with the exception 
of the miracle, but this is a problematic solution in and of itself. 
As occult, hidden and insensible causes become components of scientific 
explanations in the seventeenth century, this restriction vanishes. Both meanings 
are in parallel use during this time. From William Gilberts De Magnete, one of the 
founding documents of experimental philosophy around 1600, to Isaac Newton’s 
Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, natural philosophy investigates 
insensible forces by observing their visible effects. The mission of the new 
science, also connected to the names of Gassendi, Bacon, Hooke and Boyle, is to 
show that the insensible is not necessarily inexplicable. For example, Robert 
Boyle’s experimental program explicitly tries to control insensible forces 
mechanically without speculating on their origin.12 He attempts to explain all 
movement with the help of what he identifies as smallest bodies, called effluvia or 
corpuscles. The movement of these bodies causes everything, even carrying light 
from the sun to Earth. The underlying assumption is the existence of a world 
beyond the sphere of the senses, consisting of smallest bodies which can be 
accessed with the aid of theory and experimentation.  
                                                 
11
 See Paul R. Blum, “Qualitates occultae: Zur philosophischen Vorgeschichte eines 
Schlüsselbegriffs zwischen Okkultismus und Wissenschaft,” in Die 
okkulten Wissenschaften in der Renaissance, ed. August Buck 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1992). 
12
 See Barbara Shapiro, “Testimony in Seventeenth-Century English natural Philosophy: 
Legal Origins and early Development,” Studies In History and Philosophy of Science, 
Part A 33, no. 2 (2002). 
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In the seventeenth century, natural philosophers are confronted with so 
many insensible phenomena – the surface of the moon, the cell, gravity, 
magnetism, electricity – that it becomes impossible not to consider occult causes. 
As Keith Hutchison has shown in his seminal study What happened to Occult 
Qualities in the Scientific Revolution?, it is not the idea of occult qualities as such 
but the assumption that they are inexplicable which shifts at this time. The natural 
philosophies of this age, engaged with occult causes in the sense of the insensible, 
refuse to grant a place to generally inexplicable causes. In the words of 
Hutchison: “With the acceptance of insensible agencies into the scope of natural 
philosophy, the word ‘occult’ lost its connotation of ‘insensible’ and henceforth 
referred solely to the unintelligibility of the world.”13 Significant for this process 
is a shift that at the same time consolidates the investigation of the insensible as a 
research program, for example with Newton, and prepares the occult and the 
inexplicable to be banned as unscientific. Both meanings thus enter a new relation 
to and detach from one another. 
Philosophers of the time underline the fact that the new sciences are 
capabale of comprehending occult qualities. René Descartes for example argues 
that “[...] there are no qualities which are so occult, no effects of sympathy or 
antipathy so marvelous or so strange, nor any other thing so rare in nature 
(granted that it is produced by purely material causes destitute of thought and free 
will), that its reason cannot be given by [the principles of the mechanical 
philosophy.]”14 Descartes wishes to investigate occult causes and explain 
insensible agencies because his mechanistic philosophy leaves no room for 
unknown causes, though it is open to representations of the insensible and their 
experimental investigation. It is typical for such theories to restrict their scope to 
matter and movement as the irreducible principles because only these are 
describable with causa efficiens and thus demonstrable by experiment. Descartes 
combines causa efficiens with causa materialis and assigns them universality, 
while causa finalis and causa formalis are no longer considered reasonable. How 
successful such experiments were is another question altogether. 
This conceptual shift is most obvious in Isaac Newton’s writings. When he 
uses the term occult around 1700, he solely refers to insensible causes. They are, 
though only indirectly, explainable and acceptable. The reason for Newton’s 
success is his refusal to accept the insufficient explanations of contemporary 
                                                 
13
 Keith Hutchison, “What Happened to Occult Qualities the Scientific Revolution?,” Isis 
73, no. 2 (1982): 233. 
14
 Unfortunately, the English translation of the Principia Philosophiae is useless, as it 
leaves out central parts of the text. I am thus forced to quote here the translation by 
Hutchison: ibid., 242. 
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corpuscularian philosophies. Instead, Newton restricts himself to observation and 
the induction of universal laws:  
These principles I consider, not as occult qualities, supposed to 
result from specific Forms of Things, but as general Laws of 
Nature, by which the Things themselves are formed; their Truth 
appearing to us by Phaenomena, though their Causes be not yet 
discovered. For these are manifest Qualities and their Causes only 
are occult.15  
His experimental and mathematical approach allows him to treat insensible occult 
causes in a reasonable way by experimentally investigating the facts without 
hypothesizing about their inexplicable origin.16 This is the popular canonical 
interpretation of the hard scientist Newton. I will come back to his other side 
soon. 
This epistemological shift  in the meaning stressed is fundamentally bound 
to instruments, the microscope, the telescope, mechanical clocks and the vacuum. 
They unseal a space which was categorically inaccessible prior to their 
invention.17 The transformation of this frontier goes hand in hand with a 
revaluation of instruments that inscribe or record what is hidden to the senses. 
Science, we could say, utilizes these new instruments to cut past surfaces, into the 
inner spheres once taken as occult. As Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin have 
shown, the establishment of the experimental sciences rests on a debate about 
testimony and criteria for credibility.18 The accumulation of technical innovations 
makes possible new experiments and thus raises the question of their productivity 
in the production of knowledge. In the seventeenth century, the observation of 
what is hidden to the senses is taken over by the microscope and the telescope, 
                                                 
15
 Isaac Newton, Opticks: Or, A Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections & 
Colours of Light (New York: Dover, 1717/1952), Reprint: 401. 
16
 Cf. I. Bernhard Cohen, Franklin and Newton: An Inquiry into Speculative Newtonian 
Science and Franklin's Work in Electricity as an Example thereof (Philadelphia: 
American Philosophical Society, 1956). 
17
 Cf. Catherine Wilson, The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention 
of the Microscope (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Helmut Zander has 
shown how instruments reformulate to the assumption of a paradise or underworld 
beyond the sphere of the senses: Helmut Zander, “Höhere Erkenntnis: Die Erfindung des 
Fernrohrs und die Konstruktion erweiterter Wahrnehmungsfähigkeiten zwischen dem 17. 
und dem 20. Jahrhundert,” in Trancemedien und neue Medien um 1900: Ein anderer 
Blick auf die Moderne, ed. Marcus Hahn and Erhard Schüttpelz (Bielefeld: Transcript, 
2009). 
18
 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the 
Experimental Life, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).  
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and in the nineteenth century, by “self-registering scales, meters for temperature 
and other ingeniously constructed instruments.”19 The testimony provided by 
these instruments extends human organs through new sensibilities of registering, 
observing and inscribing, where the senses are now only secondary to that of the 
instrument. Not only human spectators, but also tools of experimentation are 
granted the ability to observe: They can prove and falsify. They create situations 
for the judgement of the scientist. They exceed his reliability and precision. They 
are independent from belief, religion, and politics. They testify to the insensible. 
In the ideal case, experimental systems allow scientists to set and control all 
experimental variables in order to observe every change, and knowledge 
production becomes the difference between what is expected and what actually 
happens.20 Mechanical testimony becomes an epistemic multiplier.  
The arena of this new science is a ‘public space’, as, for example, the 
standardized registers of the Royal Society in London show.21 Its members, the 
Gentlemen, as they call themselves, may decide upon truths because their 
instruments allow them to make these decisions. The testimony of instruments 
does not undermine but strengthens the status of the scientist, as he now has to 
decide upon the reliability of the instrument. Christoph Meinel has shown that the 
new conception natural philosophers develop of themselves at this time as public, 
social and credible actors leads to the banishment of occult knowledge. Equipped 
with undeceivable instruments, the scientist has the power to exclude all that 
refuses to obey the new rules. The occult, Meinel concludes, becomes enemy 
territory and is attacked polemically. Thus both concepts, “the occult sciences and 
the exact sciences, turn out to be what they were originally: polemical and 
usurpatory concepts without strict systematic demarcation; terms which carry 
claims, terms of rather dubious value for historical research.”22 While Meinel is 
surely correct that both terms are not sufficient to describe the boundary defying 
                                                 
19
 Albert Schrenck-Notzing, Materialisations-Phaenomene (Munich: Reinhard, 1914), 28. 
(“selbstregistrierende Waagen, Temperaturmesser sowie sonstige sinnreich konstruierte 
Instrumente.”) 
20
 Cf. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Experimentalsysteme und epistemische Dinge 
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2006). 
21
 Cf. Steven Shapin, “Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle's Literary Technology,” 
Social Studies of Science 14, no. 4 (1984): 485. 
22
 Christoph Meinel, “Okkulte und exakte Wissenschaften,” in Die 
okkulten Wissenschaften in der Renaissance, ed. August Buck 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1992), 21–44. (“vermutlich beide Begriffe, der der okkulten 
Wissenschaften wie der der exakten, als das heraus, was sie ursprünglich waren: 
polemisch-usurpatorische Begriffe ohne scharfe systematische Abgrenzung, Begriffe, an 
die sich Ansprüche knüpfen, kurz, Begriffe von eher zweifelhaftem Wert für die 
historische Forschung.”) 
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practices that operate between them, it is important to explore how this boundary 
is polemically constructed, preserved and occasionally penetrated. 
 
Correspondence at a distance 
The reliability and testimony of instruments rests on the assumption that 
everything that happens has a cause. The principle of causa efficiens guarantees 
that identical experiments have identical results. Only causa efficiens suffices to 
explain experiments because it makes the beginning of movements or changes 
predictable when two bodies act on each other, insofar as identical causes have 
identical effects. Predictability becomes an indispensable criterion for successful 
experimentation in the seventeenth century. Action at a distance is thus excluded 
as an explanation. With his unexplained laws of gravity and the subsequent 
introduction of ethers and spirits, Newton ends up in the middle of this conflict. 
Focusing on his debate with Leibniz, I want to show how closely the occult, 
causality and media are connected and how powerful the accusation of occult 
causes becomes around 1700. At the same time the exploration of the insensible is 
established as the terrain of science. 
In 1716, English theologian Samuel Clarke, acting as a representative of 
Newton, writes to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz:  
That one body should attract another without any intermediate 
means, is indeed not a miracle, but a contradiction: for it is 
supposing something to act where it is not. But the means by 
which two bodies attract each other, may be invisible and 
intangible, and of a different nature from mechanism; and yet, 
acting regularly and constantly, may well be called natural, being 
much less wonderful than animal-motion, which yet is never called 
a miracle.23 
Leibniz answers:  
But then what does he mean, when he will have the sun attract the 
globe of the earth through empty space? Is it God himself that 
performs it? But this would be a miracle, if ever there was any. 
This would surely exceed the powers of creatures. Or are perhaps 
some immaterial substances, or some spiritual rays, or some 
                                                 
23
 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 
with the assistance of Henry G. Alexander (New York: Manchester University Press, 
1956), 53. Cf. Gerd Buchdahl, “History of Science and Criteria of Choice,” Minnesota 
Studies in Philosophy of Science, no. 5 (1970). 
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accident without a substance, or some kind of species intentionalis, 
or some other I know not what the means [Medium] by which this 
is pretended to be performed? Of which sort of things the author 
seems to have still a good stock in his head, without explaining 
himself sufficiently. That means of communication [Medium zur 
Übertragung] (says he) is invisible, intangible, not mechanical. He 
might well have added, inexplicable, unintelligible, precarious, 
groundless and unexampled. […] It must be a perpetual miracle, 
and if it is not, it is false. It is a chimerical thing, a scholastic occult 
quality.”24  
Already this short excerpt from one of the major documents of physico-
philosophical thought in the early 18th century shows the disruption of the 
foundations of physics occasioned by Newton’s introduction of a supposedly 
immediate action at a distance. Gravity, Newton implies, acts between bodies 
without any delay. There is no ∆t indicating the temporal duration of forces in 
Newton’s formula.25 Whether this immediate attraction is a miracle, occult or 
impossible, as Leibniz argues, or a force that simply has not been explained yet 
but should be investigated because of its explanatory evidence, as Clarke and 
Newton suggest, forms the most pressing question in the correspondence. Two 
very different physical systems that lead to even more different metaphysics are 
confronted here—despite their protestant proximity.26 
Action at a distance contradicts the foundations of both doctrines because 
something that acts at the same time and without a material connection at two 
different places violates the nexus of causality and continuity. Action at a distance 
thus is deemed occult – invisible and inexplicable. The temporal order of the new 
science is a causal order in which cause and effect cohere in the sense of causa 
efficiens in three regards: spatially they must be connected; temporally one has to 
follow the other; and they have to occur together but not at the same instant.27 The 
                                                 
24
 Leibniz and Clarke, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 94. 
25
 Cf. Nancy J. Nersessian, “Aether/or: The Creation of Scientific Concepts,” Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of Science 15, no. 3 (1984). 
26
 The political backgrounds are discussed in Steven Shapin’s “Of Gods and Kings: 
Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Leibniz-Clarke Disputes,” Isis 72, no. 2 (1981); 
and Domenico B. Meli’s “Caroline, Leibniz, and Clarke,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
60 (1999). 
27
 In the words of Leibniz: “All the natural forces of bodies are subject to mechanical laws; 
and all the natural powers of spirits are subject to moral laws. The former follow the 
order of efficient causes; and the latter follow the order of final causes.” Leibniz and 
Clarke, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 95. Cf. Martin Carrier, Raum-Zeit (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 8; Adolf Grünbaum, Philosophical Problems of Space and 
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cause has to happen before the materially connected effect in the same location. 
Otherwise it would be impossible to keep them apart. Nonetheless, one must 
follow the other in such short succession that they can be linked. Therefore, delay 
is inherent to all causality. Only under these conditions do objects qualify as 
scientific evidence, subject to experimental exploration. It is only in keeping with 
these premises, then, that natural laws make sense. But what about gravity, 
electricity, magnetism—what about occult qualities? 
Over the centuries, beginning in Antiquity and discussed later in many 
different physical and philosophical contexts, several theoretical solutions have 
been developed to solve these questions. The following precise formulation from 
the Aristotelian beginning of the early modern period gives an impression of their 
dimensions: “Omnis actio fit per contactum, quo fit ut nihil agat in distans nisi per 
aliquid medium.”28 In English: Every effect happens by contact, because nothing 
acts at a distance without a medium. Consequently, only mediated effects are 
allowed. Nevertheless, the physical concept of mediation emerging from this 
constellation attempts to bridge the gaps of causality inherent to matter and is thus 
often described as immediate. Mary Hesse has distinguished three related 
historical modes to explain action at a distance:29 The first mode, popular in 
Descartes’ writings, establishes direct causation by inventing corpuscles or 
effluvia. These invisible bodies cohere and form a connection between two larger 
entities in which each corpuscle moves the next. The ultimate role of this 
mechanical model is to explain the empty space between the corpuscles. 
Secondly, action at a distance can be described as an ethereal medium. The 
underlying assumption is the existence of substances that fill all space. The ether 
closes the gap between cause and effect, but reserves the possibility of action 
occurring at short distances. In this way, it transmits action at a distance and 
produces a form of immediacy. The discourses on ethers, therefore, neglect 
mediation, though they do make references to it. As an “argumentative 
resource”30 the application of the ether depends on the philosophical or physical 
                                                                                                                                     
Time (London: Routledge, 1964); and Andreas Hüttemann, ed., Kausalität und 
Naturgesetz in der Frühen Neuzeit (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2001). 
28
 Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (1614): Summa Philosophiae, quoted in Leo Spitzer, “Milieu 
and Ambiance,” in Essays in historical Semantics, 179–316 (New York: Vanni, 1948), 
201. 
29
 Cf. Mary B. Hesse, “Action at a Distance in Classical Physics,” Isis 46, no. 4 (1955). 
30
 G. N. Cantor, “The Theological Significance of Ethers,” in Conceptions of 
Ether: Studies in the History of Ether Theories 1740-1900, ed. G. N. Cantor and Hodge, 
M. J. S. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 135–56, 152. Cf. Albert 
Kümmel-Schnur, “Einleitung: Äther als Medium der Medienwissenschaft?,” in 
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problems it has to solve. In some cases, these two modes overlap and the ether 
consists of corpuscles. The third alternative is genuine action at a distance with 
unknown properties. It may be traceable to unknown but explicable causes or to 
occult qualities. All three modes have historically implied the introduction of 
mediating concepts. 
The relation of these three possibilities is discussed extensively in the 
correspondence. In his Queries, more or less hypothesizing additions to his works, 
and in the Scholium Generale, a late and hermetic appendix to a reprint of the 
Principia from 1713, Newton allows himself what he strictly forbid to others: He 
speculates on ethers, actions at a distance and occult causes.31 With the help of 
such active, ethereal forces of gravity and other phenomena, he seeks to show that 
he is able to do without inexplicable forces in his theories and explanations, 
instead turning to a medium. Though his former explanations were restricted to 
matter, movement and force – his motto being hypotheses non fingo – he 
introduces non-mechanical active principles and spirits. Considering the 
possibility that a corpuscular medium could communicate the forces in question, 
he revokes the idea of immediate action at a distance.32 Newton is no hardcore-
Newtonian. Following Gideon Freudenthal, we can state that Newton employed 
all three modes: a genuine, inexplicable action at a distance, a mechanical 
explanation by corpuscles or by ethers and finally the suspension of the question 
due to its respective unanswerability.33  
Newton must, of course, oppose occult qualities in the scholastic sense. It 
is, however, still possible, he claims, to observe phenomena and suggest 
                                                                                                                                     
Äther: Ein Medium der Moderne, ed. Albert Kümmel-Schnur and Jens Schröter 
(Bielefeld: Transcript, 2008). 
31
 Even when operating with an action at a distance, Newton writes: “It is inconceivable 
that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else, which is not 
material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must do if 
gravitation, in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it. That gravity should 
be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body can act upon another at a 
distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through 
which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an 
absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of 
thinking can ever fall into it.” Letter from Newton to Bentley, 1692, in Isaac Newton, 
Isaac Newton's Papers & Letters on Natural Philosophy, with the assistance of Bernard I. 
Cohen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 302. 
32
 Cf. Henry Guerlac, “Newton's Optical Aether: His Draft of a Proposed Addition to his 
Optics,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 22, 1/2 (1967). 
33
 Cf. Gideon Freudenthal, Atom und Individuum im Zeitalter Newtons: Zur Genese der 
mechanistischen Natur- und Sozialphilosophie (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), 95. 
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underlying insensible forces: “But the reason of these properties of gravity I could 
not deduce from phaenomena, and I do not devise hypotheses. For whatever is not 
deducted from phaenomena, is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, 
whether metaphysical or physical, or of occult or mechanical qualities, have no 
place in experimental philosophy.”34 From Newton’s point of view, natural laws 
cannot be deduced from hypothetical forces, but only from observation. This is 
precisely the case with gravitation, magnetism and electricity.35  
And the Aristotelians gave the Name of occult Qualities, not to 
manifest Qualities, but to such Qualities only as they supposed to 
lie hid in Bodies, and to be the unknown Causes of manifest 
Effects: Such as would be the Causes of Gravity, and of magnetick 
and electrick Attractions, and of Fermentation, if we should 
suppose that these Forces or Actions arose from Qualities 
unknown to us, and uncapable of being discovered and made 
manifest. Such occult Qualities put a stop to the Improvement of 
natural Philosophy, and therefore of late Years have been 
rejected.36 
‘Such occult qualities’ are inexplicable and insensible. Despite the limitations 
posed by the inexplicable, it is necessary for the advancement of Newtonian 
                                                 
34
 Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, with the 
assistance of I. B. Cohen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 943. In 
another text Newton is even more rigid: “Some I know disapprove this conclusion [the 
law of gravity] and mutter something about occult qualities. They continually are 
cavilling with us that gravity is an occult property, and occult causes are to be quite 
banished from philosophy. But to this the answer is easy: that those are indeed occult 
causes whose existence is occult, and imagined but not proved, but not those whose real 
existence is clearly demonstrated by observations. Therefore gravity can by no means be 
called an occult cause of the celestial motions, because it is plain from the phenomena 
that such power does really exist. Those rather have recourse to occult causes who set 
imaginary vortices of a matter entirely fictitious and imperceptible by our senses to direct 
those motions. But shall gravity be therefore called an occult cause and thrown out of 
philosophy because the cause of gravity is occult and not yet discovered?” Quoted in: 
Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. With the assistance of 
Florian Cajori. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1687/1934), XXVII. 
35
 Cf. Henry, John, “Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy: Active Principles 
in pre-newtonian Matter Theory,” History of Science 24, 335-381 (1986): 362. See also 
Freudenthal, Atom und Individuum im Zeitalter Newtons; and Michael Friedman, “Kant 
and Newton: Why Gravity is Essential to Matter,” in Philosophical Perspectives on 
Newtonian Science, ed. Philipp Bricker and R. I. G. Hughes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1990). 
36
 Newton, Opticks, 401. 
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science to envisage the investigation of the insensible. Against this backdrop, 
Newton’s hypothetical speculation about ethers, spirits and effluvia do not appear 
as the contradictory, dark side of the hard scientist. They can be explained, rather, 
by his understanding of ‘occult’.37  
It is at exactly this juncture that Leibniz detects the danger of miraculously 
introducing media where nothing exists and of explaining miracles mechanically, 
because the supposed spirits form a connection that makes something act where it 
is not. Leibniz’s metaphysical argument asserts that Newton’s conception of 
gravity and the medium introduced by Clarke grant too much legitimacy to 
miracles and spirits. For Leibniz, a miracle is an event that cannot be explained by 
the nature of things because it demands infinite power. It does not obey the 
principle of sufficient reason, and has a causa finalis, but no causa efficiens. It 
can only be accomplished by God and only for reasons of grace, but not to sustain 
the universe. Every act of God is a threat to the perfectly stabilized order of the 
world. The principles governing the universe also apply to God and manifest his 
omniscience, because they don’t enhance or have to be enhanced. There is no loss 
in the world because every cause has a corresponding effect and God does not 
need to act. If he acts there must be a reason. This leads to a chain of causality in 
which forces are transmitted infinitely and without loss from causes to effects. 
Newton’s assumption of heavenly intervention is not necessary. Leibniz does not 
maintain that divine actions at a distance exist; he states that there are no actions 
at a distance, but if there were, they would necessarily be divine because only 
God could cause them. 
For the English physicists, natural laws are bound to God’s interventions 
and consequently miracles do not constitute a contradiction, even if they imply 
action at a distance.38 God must sustain the universal order. Action at a distance 
could thus be an unproblematic act of God aimed at just this, but it could also hint 
at yet undiscovered causes. It would, then, seem miraculous while still abiding 
natural laws. When Clarke replies to Leibniz’s accusation that his conception of 
gravity is scholastic, he claims that even though the causes might be occult, the 
                                                 
37
 On another occasion, Hutchison remarked that mechanistic philosophy made the occult 
and supernatural acceptable and developed an understanding of science as a project 
which gives the occult a place in the world: “Indeed, I propose that an important function 
of the new view of matter was to protect a radically supernaturalistic ontology against the 
the naturalism of the Renaissance. The mechanists’ conception of matter as totally barren 
was used to offer a guarantee that supernatural activity was ever-present in the universe.” 
See Keith Hutchison, “Supernaturalism and the Mechanical Philosophy,” History of 
Science 21 (1983), 297. 
38
 Cf. Carolyn Iltis, “The Leibnizian-Newtonian Debates: Natural Philosophy and Social 
Psychology,” British Journal for the History of Science 6, no. 4 (1973). 
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observable and measureable effects are still worth exploring, presupposing that 
occult does not mean inexplicable. Consequently, it is possible to explain effects 
of the insensible. 
In his last letter, Leibniz is forced to move away from the position that 
gravity is a miracle and thus a mistake. The application of the laws is too evident. 
Instead, he wrenches an admission from Clarke: His theology has to refrain from 
a force passively inherent to matter and assume an active principle affecting 
bodies from the outside.39 Their immediate action at a distance acts at two places 
at the same time. This, of course, is opposed by Newton and Clarke. But Leibniz 
wants to push them to assume active principles in order to attack their position. 
For his principle of sufficient reason, only matter can act on matter, but not, as he 
writes to Clarke, “some immaterial substances, or some spiritual rays, or some 
accident without a substance, or some kind of species intentionalis, or some other 
I know not what the means”40. Like Descartes, Leibniz assumes that small 
swirling particles trigger attraction and repulsion. All action thus must have a 
mechanical cause. Newton in turn argues against action at a distance because it 
would be inherent to matter. With this physical argument accompanying the 
metaphysical, he explicitly comes to the conclusion that forces only act through 
the relation of bodies. These active principles are not thought of as occult 
qualities, but as natural laws.41 Unfortunately, the correspondence stops at this 
point. Clarke’s fifth letter did not reach Leibniz, who died in November 1716. 
As these preliminary remarks have shown, the correspondence can be read 
as a discussion about the margins of media and communication. In this regard, 
Leibniz’s most important point is this: Structurally, the function of introducing 
media into an argument is to effortlessly elicit the appearance of a judgement. In 
fact, in cases such as Newton’s spirits, a miracle has simply been redefined as a 
medium. For Leibniz, Newton’s universe lacks reason, because with spirits and 
ethers he explains what he cannot explain otherwise. Occult qualities can be 
called media, and thus appear as nothing more than effects of their rhetorical 
application. They help to gloss over open questions and theoretical gaps and 
consequently have a productive function. At stake is not just the persuasiveness of 
arguments or the commitment of philosophers. At stake is the ultimate. In a 
Leibnizian world, God would be different than in a Newtonian world. All this is 
                                                 
39
 Cf. Michael Friedman, “Kant and Newton: Why Gravity is Essential to Matter,” in 
Philosophical Perspectives on Newtonian Science, ed. Philipp Bricker and R. I. G. 
Hughes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990). 
40
 Leibniz and Clarke, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 94. 
41
 Cf. Renate Wahsner, Das Aktive und das Passive: Zur erkenntnistheoretischen 
Begründung der Physik durch den Atomismus (Berlin: Akademie, 1981). 
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discussed as a problem of mediation that reaches into the heart of physics and 
shows the dependency of the concepts of media and communication on the occult.  
 
Spiritualism and science in the Nineteenth century 
Because the immediacy of action at a distance is forbidden for theological and 
philosophical reasons, physics has to investigate an in-between that tends to be 
negated. Actions at a distance close all distances, delays and gaps. Media, in this 
sense, connect and separate at the same instant. The in-between vanishes when 
they are described as immediate. The Neokantian philosopher Otto Liebmann gets 
right to the point of this proximity of causality and the occult in a discussion of 
the inexplicability of Newtonian forces in 1876: “Forces are ghosts of causality, 
but they are real and not imaginary. Take an iron key in the hand and approach a 
strong electromagnet to a distance of a few inches, then you will feel the ghost. It 
is there! And if you slide a strong partition between key and magnet, for example 
an oak board or a glass plate of an inch – it does not matter – this puzzling, 
mystical actio in distans still acts.”42 What Liebmann describes as a ghost of 
causality is the insensible causality of a force that acts in inexplicable ways. It is 
simply there. In this sense, and referring to the old double meaning, every 
causation over a distance is of occult origin. Ghosts of causality, spirits, ethers 
and effluvia loom where science is confronted with gravitational, electric or 
magnetic phenomena and their aporetic constellations of absence and presence. 
They appear where bodies or forces are in places where they should not be, like 
the ghosts evoked by spiritualism and occultism. At the time of Liebmann’s 
writings, spiritualists begin to investigate ghosts with the same experimental 
configurations scientists use to observe their forces—with instruments that are 
supposed to distinguish between miracles and natural events, but that tend to 
produce these events. With their implemented causality, they are thought to be 
immune to occult qualities and actions at a distance. 
To come to an end, I want to draw two conclusions regarding the 
engagement with nineteenth century spiritualism. It is well known that many 
spiritualists understand the movement as modernistic and progressive, even 
though this might, in the words of Erhard Schüttpelz, “not be the modernity we 
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 Otto Liebmann, Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit (Straßburg: Trübner, 1876), 269. “Kräfte 
sind Kausalgespenster, aber reale, nicht imaginäre. Man nehme einen eisernen Schlüssel 
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would retrospectively expect from the nineteenth century.”43 My first point is, not 
very surprisingly, that the ambitions of spiritualists run parallel to early modern 
and also contemporary scientists. When, for example, Alfred Schrenck-Notzing 
rejects “every theory for my own observations in all forms,”44 he follows 
Newton’s hypotheses non fingo exactly. As Richard Noakes has shown, the 
debates of Psychical Research revolve around the question of whether the 
observed phenomena empirically elude natural laws or depend on laws not yet 
known.45 These researchers, while distinguishing themselves from spiritualists, 
draw the same lines of demarcation and understand their work as a program of 
empirical investigation without hypotheses. “We must not mix up the exact and 
the inexact, culminating in the development of parapsychology. The supremacy of 
accuracy must be absolute.” These are the words of Oliver Lodge, who clearly 
distinguishes his work from “pseudo-scientific spiritualist[s]”46. Carl Du Prel uses 
a similar formulation: “Though occultism shows natural forces that we don’t 
know, still causality prevails here as in a physical laboratory.”47 Though Du Prel 
assumes an evolutionary development of human consciousness parallel to the 
advancement of scientific-spiritiualistic knowledge, his argument has the same 
intention as those that became prevalent in the seventeenth century, follows the 
same lines of causality, and uses the concept of a medium for the same reasons. 
From these few examples, we can draw the following implications: The 
authorizing gestures and distinctions occupying spiritualism are similar to those of 
science, as they both argue against the occult. In this sense, spiritualism, too, 
opposes the inexplicable occult while concurrently investigating the insensible 
occult. In other words, the constitution of science is repeated in the heart of 
spiritualism. But as a historical process the importance of this transformation 
becomes only intelligible when taking into account the manner in which the 
insensible and the inexplicable become differentiated. The insensible becomes the 
realm of instruments: They serve to banish the occult through the observation and 
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 Erhard Schüttpelz, “Mediumismus und moderne Medien: Die Probe des europäischen 
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inscription of hidden causalities, and in this function they are available to both 
scientists and spiritualists. 
If the way in which science conceptualizes its own activities since the 
seventeenth century depends on the testimony of instruments; if this testimony of 
inscriptions and recordings observes the occult in the sense of the insensible while 
at the same time banishing the occult in the sense of the inexplicable because it is 
not causally ascertainable; and if in this historical process the strict boundary 
between science and non-science is introduced; then what does all this mean for 
the varied forms of spiritualism that appear in the nineteenth century? They 
understand themselves as scientific, share their premises with science, and 
nonetheless appear to transgress a border constitutive for science.  
Perhaps, and this is my second conclusion, we should introduce a new 
differentiation or perspective here and inquire about the respective concepts of 
causality and about the dedicated function of action at a distance. We should look 
for alternative models for the discussion of causality in the nineteenth century—
alternatives to the dominant causa efficiens model. These causalities are the 
epistemological basis of spiritualism. They influence the concepts of instruments 
and experiments and the concept of mediation. Asking these questions in an 
attempt to articulate a strict boundary between science and non-science allows us, 
on the one hand, to grasp different uses of instruments, as the instrument’s 
function is to guarantee causality in the sense of causa efficiens, even where it is 
most improbable and action at a distance denies causality—but is open to other 
causalities. 
On the other hand, we can draw a historical line from spiritualism to the 
crisis of science around 1900, when non-Newtonian physics, non-Euclidian 
geometry, and non-Aristotelian logic unsettle the foundations of science that 
separated it from spiritualism.48 Perhaps the destiny of spiritualism around 1900 is 
bound too closely to that of science, and the modern way in which it understand 
its own role and its mode of causality are radically thrown into question with the 
rise of multimodal logic, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. After 
these upheavals, the old frontline between mechanical confirmability, sensibility, 
and speculation can no longer be sustained to reinforce the manner in which 
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scientists and occultists that see themselves as scientists comprehend their 
activities. In this process, the line of demarcation developed in the seventeenth 
century had to be rewritten. With this crisis, the contingency of all causality 
becomes visible. 
Science and spiritualism are both engaged in this crisis at the end of the 
nineteenth century. But the crisis also plays into the hands of spiritualism, because 
it transforms what apprehension and causality mean and what is explicable. It 
shifts the meaning of ‘occult’ once again, while the validity of action at a distance 
is revoked, as, for example, in quantum mechanics, C.G. Jungs ideas on 
synchronicity49 or the immediacies of media theory—but with this horizon, we 
already enter the territory of the 20th century. Then – and also now – Leibniz’s 
warning still holds: we should not mistake media for miracles, occult qualities or 
spirits that act as if there were media but turn out to be immediate. 
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 Condensed in Carl G. Jung, Synchronizität, Akausalität und Okkultismus (Munich: DTV, 
1990). 
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